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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. ] 
Craig Veale, ] 
Defendant/ Appellant. ) 
) CaseNo.20100049-CA 
) Appeal 
) Oral Argument Requested 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District Court. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 78A-3-103(2)(e), and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the 
jury's finding that Craig Veale ("Mr. Veale") acted recklessly? "A 
jury verdict will be reversed for insufficient evidence where it is 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determined that reasonable minds could not have reached the 
verdict." State v. Workman. 122 P.2d 639 (Utah 2005). 
II. Was Mr. Veale's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to 
object to the medical examiner's detailed testimony about the 
gruesome wounds suffered by the victim, and to the introduction of 
State's Exhibit No. 15, a gruesome reproduction showing the 
missing part of victim's face, when the cause of death was not at 
issue? "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 89 
P.3d 162 (Utah 2004). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 76-2-103(3), 76-2-103(4), 76-5-205, and 76-
5-206 also are determinative. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the final order and judgment of the Third 
District Court, the Honorable Anthony Quinn presiding. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Veale was charged December 30, 2002, by information with one 
count of criminal homicide. A two-day jury trial was held on June 26 and 
27,2003. The jury found Mr. Veale guilty of manslaughter. On August 18, 
2003, Mr. Veale was sentenced to one to 15 years in prison. 
A notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the entry of 
judgment against Mr. Veale. On or about January 26, 2009, Mr. Veale filed 
a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals seeking review of the 
entire decision in his case. The Court of Appeals treated Mr. Veale's filing 
as a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, which eventually was denied on June 
23, 2009. A Manning hearing was held on December 18, 2009 before Third 
District Court Judge Deno Himonas. Judge Himonas granted Mr. Veale's 
motion to reinstate the time for filing a notice of appeal by minute entry 
dated, December 18, 2009. Mr. Veale, through counsel, filed a timely notice 
of appeal on January 7, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS, INCLUDING ALL FACTS 
SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Veale guilty of 
manslaughter, a second degree felony. Docket p. 8. On August 18, 2003, 
Mr. Veale was sentenced to one to 15 years in prison. Docket p. 9. 
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At trial, an acquaintance of victim Loretta Romero, Tamra Ordway, 
testified that Mr. Veale and Ms. Romero were having relationship troubles at 
the time of the shooting, and had been for some time, and that Ms. Romero 
may have been planning to leave the relationship. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, 
p. 68, lines 7 and 13-18.) Mr. Veale also told Detective Coleman that he and 
Ms. Romero were going through a rough patch in their relationship. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 133, lines 10-22.) 
The evening of the shooting, Ms. Romero went out to a local night 
club without Mr. Veale, to play darts with friends. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, 
p. 24, lines 10-17.) Mr. Veale was left home alone, ruminating about his 
life, his lack of employment and the accompanying financial concerns that 
he had. "I just told [Jeff Ripplinger], I'm sick and tired of being out of 
work, I can't find a job and I got to do something. Everything is, the bills are 
piling up, Loretta can't handle the load herself. You know, we had already 
taken out a loan; her parents helped us with the rent. I was pretty down on 
myself because, I mean, you know having your mother-in-law pay your rent 
is not my idea of... " (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 26, lines 6-13.) Mr. Veale 
had been out of work for approximately five months prior to the shooting. 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 16, lines 11-12.) "I've always been able to pay 
my way, and [being out of work] really had taken a toll on me," Mr. Veale 
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told the jury. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 20, lines 4-6.) Mr. Veale got out 
the shotgun because he was contemplating his suicide. (Trial transcript, Vol. 
1, p. 158, lines 7-12; and Vol. 2, p 26, lines 22-25; and p. 27, line 1.) 
Mr. Veale described the steps he went through to prepare for his 
suicide to Detective Coleman. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 140, lines 11-24.) 
He also described these preparations to the jury. Eventually, around 8 or 9 
in the evening, Mr. Veale prepared to commit suicide. He undressed, 
removed his jewelry, climbed into the bathtub, "chambered a round" and 
made sure he could reach the trigger to pull it. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 
30, lines 2-15.) After 20 minutes or so in the bathtub, Mr. Veale decided to 
call his friend Jeff Ripplinger because "he could always cheer me up." 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 31, lines 19-25; and p. 32, lines 11-19.) Craig 
talked to Mr. Ripplinger about his problems. "I was just distraught. We 
were going to lose everything, our apartment, everything." (Trial transcript, 
Vol. 2, p. 32, lines 20-21.) Mr. Ripplinger then talked Mr. Veale out of 
doing "something stupid," and, by the end of the call, Mr. Veale felt a lot 
better. "Like there was still hope, you know?" (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 
33, lines 4-10.) Mr. Veale told the jury he could not recall whether he un-
chambered the round after talking to Mr. Ripplinger. (Trial transcript, Vol. 
2, p. 31, lines 22-25.) But after the telephone conversation, Mr. Veale 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
placed the gun in the bedroom, and returned to the living room to sit down. 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 32, lines 5-10.) He then drank more beer, and, 
eventually, fell asleep in the living room rocking chair sometime after 
midnight. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 130, lines 8-19; and trial transcript 
Vol. 2, p. 33, lines 12-19.) 
Ms. Romero's return to the apartment awakened Mr. Veale. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 2, p. 34, lines 1-3.) Mr. Veale commented to Ms. Romero on 
the lateness of the hour, and the couple argued. Ms. Romero told Mr. Veale 
to put the gun away. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 34-35.) At that point, Mr. 
Veale retrieved the gun, but did not remember if a round was chambered. 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 36, lines 22-25.) 
Mr. Veale testified that when he retrieved the gun to put it away, Ms. 
Romero was around the corner in the bathroom, out of his sight. The 
magazine was closed and Mr. Veale was trying to slide the pump when the 
gun went off. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 37, lines 4-8 and 18-23.) Mr. 
Veale told Detective Coleman the last thing he remembers Ms. Romero 
saying before her death is, "What... are you going to do about it?" (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 132, lines 1-7.) At trial, Mr. Veale testified Ms. 
Romero asked, "What are you going to do with that?" (Trial transcript, Vol. 
2, p. 38, lines 2-3.) Mr. Veale told Detective Coleman he didn't remember 
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"pulling the trigger." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 132, line 4; and p. 159, 
lines, 5-6.) At trial, Mr. Veale explained: "I was trying to pull the pump 
down on it to open the chamber up. Just to make sure it was safe. The 
trigger, there's a little button that you can push for the slide to come down 
and the safety [and the trigger and the slide] are all right there together. And 
I must have hit the trigger. I don't know. I don't remember pulling the 
trigger." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 38, lines 11-17.) State's Exhibit 2 is a 
photo depicting the left-hand side of the gun. On that exhibit, Mr. Veale 
pointed out for the jury the "little button" he was trying to push "[o]n the 
left-hand side of the gun, right by the trigger." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 
40, lines 1-2.) Mr. Veale explained further: "The button is so you can - if 
you're not going to fire the round that's in the chamber - you can eject the 
shell." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 40, lines 14-15.) Mr. Veale indicated he 
was standing in the hall just outside the bedroom door because he was 
relying on the light from the dressing area. He testified he was pointing the 
gun towards the light so he could see the latch. Was he aiming it at anybody 
when it went off? "No. No, I was not," he testified. Was he trying to fire the 
gun? "No, I wasn't," he testified. Did he have his finger on the trigger? "I 
don't remember. I don't think I did. But I must have. I guess, I don't know. 
I was trying to unload the gun and it went off," he testified. (Trial transcript, 
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Vol. 2, p. 41, lines 7-24.) After the gun went off, Mr. Veale sat stunned for 
a second. "I mean, it kicked back like that and I guess I ejected the shell. I 
don't remember that. And I was just kind of stunned for a minute, and I 
looked and I seen Loretta's feet. [Then,] I knew something had happened. I 
looked and I seen her and I ran and grabbed the phone and called 9-1-1." 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 42, lines 1-8.) 
Detective Coleman described the shooting as related to him by Mr. 
Veale several hours after the shooting: Mr. Veale awakened when Ms. 
Romero came home "about a quarter to two in the morning.... [Mr. Veale] 
said she was arguing with him. And he was asking her, he was challenging 
her as to where she had been. And she told him, 'That's none of your 
business. What are you going to do about it?' And at that point he describes 
stepping back and picking up the gun. And that's when he pulled the 
trigger." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 137, lines 6-15.) Detective Coleman 
quotes from his interview with Mr. Veale. "I think I just pulled her around. 
And she, what do you gotta do? It was just like that and bam, it was over." 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 138, lines 3-5.) Mr. Veale admitted to Detective 
Coleman that he was angry at the time of the shooting. (Trial transcript, 
Vol. 1, p. 139, lines 23-24.) Mr. Veale added that he had forgotten a round 
was chambered in the gun. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 139, lines 9-10.) Mr. 
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Veale also told Detective Coleman that the gun was usually stored with 
rounds in the magazine, but not in the chamber. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 
158, lines 13-18.) 
On cross examination at trial, Mr. Veale agreed with the prosecutor 
that he knew his gun was capable of killing another. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, 
p. 45, lines 18-20.) Mr. Veale also explained Ms. Romero was in the 
bathroom around the comer while he was in the hallway trying to un-
chamber a round in the gun and put it away. The gun was pointed toward 
the mirror in the bathroom while he was doing this. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, 
p. 59, lines 7-25.) He explained that Ms. Romero "must have been peeking 
around the comer" when the gun fired. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 60, lines 
8-19.) Mr. Veale testified he did not actually see her, but he heard her 
talking to him, "[b]ut she was around the comer, I thought. I was drunk, I 
wasn't paying attention." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 61, lines 2-6, and 22-
25.) Detective Coleman testified in rebuttal that Mr. Veale never mentioned 
trying to unload the gun while being interviewed by Detective Coleman 
beginning about four hours after the shooting. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 
64, lines 2-25.) Detective Coleman also testified that Mr. Veale's 
description during that interview came after Mr. Veale had been up all night, 
while Mr. Veale remained emotionally distraught, and while he still had a 
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blood alcohol level of .15 or higher. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 65, lines 
n-25. ) ' •. . ; \
 ; 
After Ms. Romero was shot, Mr. Veale called 9-1-1 to report the 
shooting. He was hysterical as he told the dispatcher: "Oh my God, I just, I 
just killed my girlfriend." (State's Exhibit 9, Transcript of 911 Dispatch 
Tape, Line 4.) The dispatcher asks, "How did you do this?" (Ex. 9, Line 9.) 
Mr. Veale exclaims, "I shot her with a shotgun!" (Ex. 9, Line 10.) He 
continues, through tears: "I shot her. I, uh, shot her with a shotgun. ... Point 
blank. She's dead. Oh, my God!" (Ex. 9, Lines 18 and 20.) Later in the call, 
Mr. Veale says, "I can't even believe how I pulled the trigger." (Ex. 9, 
Lines 50-51.) The dispatcher asks, "With a gun or a shotgun was it with?" 
(Ex. 9, Line 54.) Craig responds: "A shotgun. I, I, I can't even believe I did 
it. Oh, my God. Oh, my God." (Ex. 9, Lines 55-56.) Later, Craig says, 
"Oh, my God. I can't believe it did. Oh, my God. I can't believe I did it." 
(Ex. 9, Lines 61-62.) Still later, he screams, "Oh, my God. I can't believe. 
Oh, my God. I just blew her face right off! Oh, my God!" (Ex. 9, Lines 71-
72.) Even later, he adds, "Oh, my God. I can't believe I just killed her. ... 
No, I did not do that! Oohhh, my God!" (Ex. 9, Lines 138-40. "What have I 
done? What have I done? I can't, I can't believe it!" (Ex. 9, Line 169.) 
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Mr. Veale is crying hysterically throughout the 9-1-1 call. He 
frequently says, "I can't believe I did this. Oh, my God. ... Oh, my God. 
Oh, my God. Oh, my God." (Ex. 9, Lines 28-29.) Mr. Veale also tells the 
dispatcher of his intent to kill himself, "I had special bullets in the fucking 
gun to do, do it, do to myself!" The dispatcher tries to clarify with Mr. 
Veale: "You had the gun out to do, for?" Mr. Veale responds, "No, for, for 
myself, for, for myself. ..." (Ex. 9, Lines 76-79.) Mr. Veale continues to 
exclaim throughout the 9-1-1 call, "Oh, my God. I can't believe this has 
happened! ... I can't believe I just did this. Oh, my God! Ohhh, my God! 
Oh, my God. Ohhhh, ohhhh, my God! Oh, my. What am I gonna do?" (Ex. 
9, Lines 96, 100-02.) Later still, an anguished Mr. Veale continues, "Oh, my 
God. I can't believe it went off and, and, oh, oh, I can't even believe it went 
off!" The dispatcher replies: "Okay, so this was, this was an accident?" 
"Yeah, yeah, yeah," Mr. Veale responds. (Ex. 9, Lines 123-26.) 
Mr. Veale is clearly distraught by the death of Ms. Romero. Everyone 
he communicates with that evening and throughout the next morning 
comments on his emotional state. He is crying and screaming in anguish 
during the 9-1-1 call. (State's Ex. 9.) He is emotional when he is 
confronted by West Valley City police officer Shane Matheson, who takes 
Mr. Veale into custody. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p.84, line 18, and p. 
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85, lines 17-18.) He is still wildly upset three hours later when Officer 
Matheson escorts him from the ground floor of the police station to the 
detectives' offices on the third floor. "The closer we go to the detective's 
office, the more emotional [Mr. Veale was] and he started breathing really 
heavy. ... I told him just to relax, calm down, you know, kind of just to try 
to get him to relax a little bit." Mr. Veale responded to the officer by asking, 
"You've never killed anyone before, have you?" (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 
l,p. 101, lines 2-22.) 
Mr. Veale was "crying and whining" while in the custody of West 
Valley City police officer Sean McCarthy, who transported Mr. Veale to the 
police station. "He was not really just saying the statements calmly. He was 
yelling them." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 112, lines 17-22.) 
McCarthy testified Mr. Veale was highly emotional. (Jury Trial Transcript, 
Vol. 1, p. 113, lines 1-2, and p. 114, lines 10-12.) "He would cry as he 
spoke. ... He seemed to cry more when he spoke than anything else," 
McCarthy testified. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 116, lines 24-25.) 
Mr. Veale remains "clearly distraught" during his interview that began 
four hours later with Detective Coleman. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 132, 
lines 14-16.) 
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Officer McCarthy also testified about certain statements Mr. Veale 
made while sitting in Officer McCarthy's patrol car, statements that were 
recorded by Officer McCarthy. "Oh, my God. I can't believe I did that. I 
can't believe I did that. I can't believe it. What kind of fucking monster am 
I?" (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 106, lines 21-22.) "I can't believe I 
killed Loretta. I can't even believe it!" (State's Exhibit 10, Transcript of 
Tape Recording of Statements made by Craig Veale, line 22.) After a long 
pause, Mr. Veale adds, "I killed her. I can't even believe it! Noway. It's 
not real. This isn't, this isn't happening! Oh, my God. Oh, I'm so sorry, so 
sorry. ... I'm so sorry. So sorry. That gun was meant for myself." (State's 
Ex. 10, lines 24-27.) Mr. Veale emotionally continues: "Oh, I can't believe 
this, that I did that. ... Oh, my God! Oh, my God I, oh, my God (sobbing). 
Oh, my God. Oh, my God (whining). ... Oh, my God, this is so terrible, I 
can't, oh, my God, this is the worst sin against God (crying). Oh, no, worst 
sin against God. Murder, it wasn't murder. ... I was gonna kill myself, I was 
just getting ready to kill myself and she came in and told me, 'What the fuck 
are you gonna do?' I was gonna kill myself and when I seen that, what I'd 
done, I had to call 911,1 had to. Oh, God, oh, ohhhh." (State's Ex. 10, lines 
34-51.) 
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In the meantime, the police had begun their investigation. Officer 
Matheson and Detective Coleman observed a spent shotgun shell on the 
hamper directly at Ms. Romero's feet. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 91, 
lines 9-18; p. 126, lines 22-25; and p. 127, lines 1-4.) Detective Coleman 
and investigator Kent Timothy examined the shotgun and observed that it 
was loaded with a live round and ready to be fired. (Jury Transcript, Vol. 1, 
p. 121, lines 12-22.) Detective Coleman observed, shortly after his 2 a.m. 
arrival, that Ms. Romero had only recently died. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 
119, lines 3-7; and p. 125, lines 10-14.) 
After the shooting, Mr. Veale told Detective Coleman, he again 
contemplated killing himself, and, again, could not go through with it. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 134, lines 13-14, and p. 135, lines 13-14.) 
Mr. Veale started drinking beer around 9 a.m. on the day leading up to 
the shooting. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 20, lines 15-19.) He consumed 
"about a twelve-pack" before noon that day, ran out of beer and purchased 
another 30-pack that afternoon. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 21, lines 3-8.) 
He spent the rest of the day drinking beer and watching TV. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 2, p. 21, lines 22-23.) By 5:30 that evening, when Ms. 
Romero was getting ready to leave to play darts, Mr. Veale had, "at least, 
drank a case of beer." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 24, lines 8 and 22-24; and 
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p. 25, lines 5-11.) After Ms. Romero left, Mr. Veale "just sat there and 
drank [more] beer." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 25, lines 21-23.) 
Yet, the various police officers who dealt with Mr. Veale during their 
investigation testified Mr. Veale did not appear to be severely intoxicated. 
Officer Matheson told the jury, Mr. Veale did not appear to have "trouble 
getting down from the three floors," or following directions given by the 
officer. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 83-85.) Officer McCarthy also 
testified Mr. Veale was able to walk without problem, and follow his 
instructions. (Jury Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 105, lines 24-25; p. 114, lines 21-
24; p. 115, lines 1-10; and p. 116, lines 2-19.) Detective Coleman testified 
Mr. Veale's intoxication did not appear to impair his comprehension during 
Detective Coleman's interview of Mr. Veale. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 
132, lines 23-25.) "It was apparent to me that he had had something to 
drink, some amount of alcohol. But he was, in my opinion, certainly not 
drunk or intoxicated." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 133, lines 4-6.) 
Detective Coleman administered a standard DUI breath test of Mr. 
Veale just before 8 a.m., some six hours after Mr. Veale was taken into 
custody. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 154, lines 2-20; and p. 156, lines 11-
12.) The result was .15, which by itself would give rise to the assumption 
Mr. Veale was impaired for driving purposes. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 
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154, lines 21-22; and p. 155.) And, because it had been six hours, at least, 
since Mr. Veale last drank alcohol, it was fair to assume, Detective Coleman 
conceded, Mr. Veale's blood alcohol level was even higher at the time of the 
shooting. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 156, lines 11-23.) According to 
Detective Coleman, because the rate blood alcohol declines varies from 
person to person, "a very, very general rule [as to the rate of decline] is 
approximately .01 percent per hour after drinking has stopped." (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 157, lines 4-16.) At one point, Mr. Veale told Detective 
Coleman he'd been drinking a lot within the last few months: about 30 cans 
of beer each day. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 163, lines 12-17.) 
Mr. Veale's friend of 20 years, Jeff Ripplinger, saw Mr. Veale on the 
evening of the shooting, and, later, talked to him on the telephone at about 7 
or 8 that evening. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 6-7.) Mr. Ripplinger noted 
Mr. Veale didn't seem intoxicated, although Mr. Veale did seem "a little bit 
down." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 7, lines 3-9.) Mr. Ripplinger talked to 
Mr. Veale again later that night, around 9 or 10. At that time, to Mr. 
Ripplinger, Mr. Veale "seemed pretty down. He was really depressed, you 
know, the situation, not working and things like that." (Trial transcript, Vol. 
2, p. 7, lines 22-24.) Mr. Veale told Mr. Ripplinger he was depressed about 
"being out of work, the bills piling up, just, you know, how a person feels 
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when, you know, they've been out of work for a while." Mr. Ripplinger said 
Mr. Veale seemed suicidal. "I was pretty concerned about that. That's why 
I sat and talked to him for awhile: to see if I could talk him, you know, out 
of doing anything." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 8, lines 9-14.) Mr. 
Ripplinger also said that Mr. Veale's mood seemed to be deteriorating 
throughout the evening, but that Mr. Veale did not seem to be angry, except 
"[m]aybe at himself more than anybody else." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 
10, lines 1-3.) Mr. Veale mentioned the possibility of suicide to Mr. 
Ripplinger, and told Mr. Ripplinger that he had his gun out. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 2, p. 12, lines 1-6.) 
Detective Coleman's interview of Mr. Veale was conducted at the 
West Valley City police station beginning at 5:53 a.m. in the morning, about 
four hours after Mr. Veale's 9-1-1 call. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 129, line 
18.) Detective Coleman gave Mr. Veale a Miranda warning. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 129, lines 19-20.) After this, Mr. Veale agreed to speak 
to the detective. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 130, lines 1-3.) 
Mr. Veale told Detective Coleman that "he could not justify his 
actions and what he had done." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 141, lines 6-7.) 
"[Mr. Veale] at one point characterized [the shooting] as a mistake, saying it 
was the worst mistake that he'll ever make. At another point he stated that 
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he would not characterize this as domestic violence. When I asked him to 
clarify, he said, 'I would classify this as drunken stupidity.'" (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 141, lines 10-14.) Mr. Veale also told Detective 
Coleman that he could not "even remember pulling the trigger." (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 159, lines 5-9.) 
At trial, Detective Coleman acknowledged other statements made by 
Mr. Veale. Mr. Veale told the detective he had chambered a round while 
contemplating suicide, and that by the time Ms. Romero returned home, he 
"forgot that [he] had already chambered a round. ... I totally didn't think 
that there was [a round] in the chamber. I totally never, never, never meant 
to kill her ... forgot that I chambered a round, because I've, I've, I've about, 
you know, I've been contemplating suicide for a long time." (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 160-161.) Mr. Veale told the jury-he did not worry 
about keeping a loaded shotgun in his house because, "I don't keep [a round] 
in the chamber." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 28, line 25; and p. 29, lines 1-
4.) 
Detective Coleman was present when the shotgun was tested and 
inspected several months after the shooting. He indicated efforts were made 
during testing to see if the gun could be made to fire without pulling the 
trigger, or while the safety was engaged, and that those tests were not 
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successful. 'The gun performed as it was designed to, and we were unable 
to get the gun to fire without pulling the trigger/' he testified. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 144-146.) Detective Coleman also testified that a test 
was performed with a trigger pull scale. The test purports to measure the 
amount of force in pounds necessary to pull the trigger. (Trial transcript, 
Vol. 1, p. 151, lines 1-7.) Detective Coleman testified the force required to 
pull the trigger on Mr. Veale's shotgun was "fairly standard,5' and that he 
would not describe the trigger on Mr. Veale's gun as a "hair trigger." (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 1, p. 152, lines 8-14.) 
Dr. Maureen Frikke, a medical examiner employed by the State of 
Utah, also testified at trial. She estimated the shotgun was in front of Ms. 
Romero, and off to the right. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 171, lines 21-23.) 
Dr. Frikke also estimated the muzzle of the shotgun was within three or four 
feet of Ms. Romero at the time of the shooting. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 
180, lines 13-15.) Dr. Frikke testified in very specific detail about the 
horrific injuries sustained by Ms. Romero as a result of the shotgun blast. 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 174-181.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is simply no evidence that Mr. Veale acted recklessly the night 
Ms. Romero died. At trial, the State made much of the relationship stmggles 
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between Mr. Veale and Ms. Romero, but this merely points to a possible 
motive for Mr. Veale's alleged murder of Ms. Romero. It does not equal 
intent, and the jury rightly rejected such a notion. Further, the State would 
have had the jury believe that Mr. Veale's anguished statements to the 9-1-1 
dispatcher and various police personnel amounted to admissions of guilt. 
While it is true Mr. Veale felt responsible for the death of his girlfriend, his 
anguished cries of responsibility did not amount to expressions of his state 
of mind at the time of the shooting. Mr. Veale's anguished cries were 
expressions of his feelings of responsibility, and they were expressed loudly, 
repeatedly, drunkenly, and distressfully on the night of Ms. Romero's tragic 
death. Such expressions may have led the jury wrongly to conclude he acted 
recklessly when he caused her death. But the evidence presented to the jury 
belies the notion he acted recklessly. 
Mr. Veale's behavior was terribly and tragically negligent on the night 
Ms. Romero died. This is what the evidence shows. Nothing more. The 
evidence does not show Mr. Veale harbored the intent to kill Ms. Romero. 
And, the evidence does not show Mr. Veale acted recklessly in the legal 
sense because it does not show he was aware he was taking a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk when he picked up what he believed was an unloaded 
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shotgun. Further, the evidence also does not show Mr. Veale consciously 
disregarded that risk. 
Furthermore, defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
the prejudicial and inflammatory testimony of the medical examiner. 
Because the cause of death was not an issue in this trial, the gruesome, 
detailed descriptions of the victim's injuries could serve no other purpose 
than to inflame the jury' s passions against Appellant. If not for this 
inflammatory testimony, the jury likely would have believed Appellant's 
description of this incident as an accident, and likely convicted him of 
criminally negligent homicide. Thus, Appellant was deprived of a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING APPELLANT ACTED RECKLESSLY, THUS 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING APPELLANT COMMITTED MANSLAUGHTER. 
It was unreasonable for the jury to find that Appellant acted recklessly 
on the night of Ms. Romero's death. Without a legally justified finding 
Appellant acted recklessly, there can be no finding that Appellant committed 
the crime of manslaughter. 
The burden on Appellant in this case is admittedly very high: 
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The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is highly deferential to 
a jury verdict. We begin by reviewing "the evidence and all inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict." We will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence 
only if we determine that "reasonable minds could not have reached 
the verdict." 
State v. Workman, 122 P.3d 639, 645 (Utah 2005) (citations omitted). Yet, 
this is a burden that careful review of the record reveals can be met by 
Appellant. 
A person commits manslaughter if he "recklessly causes the death of 
another." Utah Code Section 76-5-205(1 )(a) (2002). Section 76-2-103(3) 
provides, a person acts recklessly "when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-103(3) (1999). 
In a case similar to that of appellant, State v. Robinson, 63 P.3d 105 
(Utah App. 2003), the Utah Court of Appeals found the State had failed to 
produce even enough evidence for bindover after preliminary hearing. The 
Robinson court first addressed the "relatively low" burden on the State at a 
preliminary a hearing, a burden significantly less than the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard that applies at a trial. Id. at 106, footnote 1. 
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To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show "probable 
cause" at a preliminary hearing. ... The "quantum of evidence 
necessary to support a bindover" is that necessary "to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it." In assessing the evidence presented, the 
magistrate "must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." 
Id. (Omitting citations; emphasis in original.) The standard applied by the 
trial court judge at the preliminary hearing in the Robinson case is similar to 
the standard which will be applied by this Court in reviewing Appellant's 
appeal. And, like the judge in Robinson, this Court will surely find the 
evidence lacking. 
In Robinson, the facts were similar, although admittedly less well 
developed than in Appellant's trial. As the Court of Appeals noted in 
Robinson, the charge against Appellant "arose from the deadly combination 
of drinking alcohol and playing with a gun." Id. In Robinson, the Court of 
Appeals summed up the facts thusly, 
Jose Robinson and ... his sister-in-law were drinking beer and 
examining Mr. Robinson's handgun. While [his sister-in-law] was 
handling the gun, Mr. Robinson heard the slide activate. He then took 
the gun from her. Noticing that the gun appeared to be jammed, he 
pulled back on the slide, ejecting a bullet from the gun. Mr. Robinson 
put the bullet back into the clip, and the next thing he remembers is 
hearing the gun fire. He then looked over at Ms. Galbraith and 
noticed that she was slumped over the arm rest of the couch. The 
bullet had hit her just below her left ear, and she died shortly 
thereafter. Investigators who later arrived on the scene determined 
Mr. Robinson's blood alcohol level to be .10. 
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Id. (Emphasis supplied.) "Believing Mr. Robinson's conduct to be reckless, 
the State charged Mr. Robinson" with manslaughter. Id. The charge was 
dismissed after preliminary hearing. 
Contrast the facts at the time of the shooting in Robinson with the 
facts at the time of the shooting in the case now before this Court: Mr. 
Veale had been drinking beer all day long up until the time of the shooting, 
interrupted only by drunken slumber before Ms. Romero came home. Mr. 
Veale had chambered a round earlier in the evening, while contemplating 
suicide. He eventually placed the gun in the bedroom, returned to the living 
room, and drank more beer before he passed out sometime after midnight. 
Mr. Veale, at the request of Ms. Romero, retrieved the gun to put it away. 
At that time, he did not remember whether or not he had chambered a round. 
The gun was usually stored with rounds in the chamber, not in the magazine. 
Ms. Romero was out of Mr. Veale's sight, and he thought she was around 
the corner in the bathroom as he was trying to slide the pump to open the 
chamber. Ms. Romero was arguing with Mr. Veale when the gun went off. 
Mr. Veale didn't remember pulling the trigger. He was not aiming the gun 
when it fired, and he was not trying to fire the gun. Mr. Veale remembers 
being stunned at the firing of the gun. Then he looked and noticed Ms. 
Romero's feet, knew something had happened and ran to call 9-1-1. He 
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could not even bring himself to look closer at Ms. Romero. Investigators 
determined approximately six hours after the shooting that Mr. Veale's 
blood alcohol level was still .15, and could have been as high as .21 when 
the gun fired. 
Further comparison of the Robinson case with the instant appeal 
shows other similarities. Mr. Robinson told the investigating detective 
"there was nothing that caused him to think that the gun ... [was] loaded or 
anything like that." Robinson, at 108. Mr. Veale told Detective Coleman he 
couldn't remember if his gun was loaded. Mr. Robinson told the 
investigating detective "he assumed that [the gun] was empty and didn't 
have a round in the chamber." Robinson, at 108. Mr. Veale told Detective 
Coleman he was trying to pull the pump down to open the chamber "to make 
sure it was safe." Mr. Veale also told Detective Coleman, "I totally didn't 
think that there was [a round] in the chamber." The detective who 
interviewed Mr. Robinson concluded the shooting was an accident. 
Robinson, at 108. Mr. Veale told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that the shooting in 
his case was an accident. The detective who interviewed Mr. Robinson told 
the court, "[tjhere was no information that I have that would have confirmed 
for sure that he knew that [the gun] was loaded." Robinson, at 108. 
Detective Coleman did not have any information that would confirm for sure 
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that Mr. Veale knew his gun was loaded, although he believed Mr. Veale 
knew the gun was loaded, because Detective Coleman believed Mr. Veale's 
statements indicated he fired the gun intentionally. 
Admittedly, there are factual differences between the Robinson case 
and Mr. Veale's. Mr. Robinson and his victim were not in a relationship and 
were looking at the gun together. Mr. Veale and Ms. Romero were arguing 
about an unhappy circumstance in an unhappy relationship. Mr. Veale 
admitted to being angry at the time his gun fired, while there was no 
evidence of Mr. Robinson's emotional state at the time of the shooting, and, 
certainly, no hint he was angry with his victim. Mr. Robinson told 
detectives his gun was jammed, and the investigating detective testified that 
"it appeared [the gun] had been jammed." Robinson, at 108. Detective 
Coleman testified Mr. Veale's gun was later tested, and found to function 
properly. But there was also no evidence Mr. Robinson was emotionally 
distraught after his shooting. There is copious evidence of Mr. Veale's 
emotional distress after the shooting. There is also a specific suggestion by 
Mr. Veale that his shooting was an accident. There is no similar claim in 
evidence in the Robinson case. 
Recklessness requires a very specific mental state. It requires 
evidence that Mr. Veale was aware of the risk he was taking at the time Ms. 
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Romero was killed. And it requires evidence that he consciously 
disregarded that risk. Robinson, at 107, and Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-
103(3). There is no evidence, even when reviewed in a light most favorable 
to the jury verdict, that shows that Mr. Veale was aware of the risk he was 
taking while handling the gun in his drunken state, and that he consciously 
disregarded that risk. 
There is evidence Mr. Veale and Ms. Romero weren't happy in their 
relationship. There is evidence Mr. Veale was angry with Ms. Romero at 
the time of the shooting, either because she'd gone out without him or 
because she came home late. (Although Mr. Veale also testified he was not 
angry Ms. Romero had gone out alone, that she "deserved" a night out with 
friends.) There is evidence Mr. Veale had intentionally loaded the gun 
earlier on the night of the shooting, with the intention that he would commit 
suicide. 
There is no evidence, however, that, at the time of the shooting, Mr. 
Veale was aware of the risk he was taking by handling the gun. He was 
unsure if a round was even chambered. And, there is no evidence he 
consciously disregarded the risk his loaded gun presented, because he was 
unaware of the risk at the time the gun fired. At worst, he was handling the 
gun while he was arguing with Ms. Romero. At best, he was taking steps to 
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be certain a round was not chambered and that the gun was safe to be put 
away. 
A big difference between Mr. Robinson's case and Mr. Veale's case is 
that the detective interviewing Mr. Robinson believed his story and the 
detective interviewing Mr. Veale did not believe Mr. Veale. Detective 
Coleman's disbelief of Mr. Veale's explanations likely led the jury to 
misconstrue the facts. Even so, these facts do not support a finding that Mr. 
Veale was aware of the risk he was taking when he drunkenly handled the 
shotgun before Ms. Romero was killed. Ms. Romero's death arose from the 
deadly combination of drinking alcohol and mishandling a gun he did not 
know was loaded and ready to fire. His pained, emotional statements 
demonstrate his layman's sense of responsibility and guilt. His sense of 
anguish and responsibility cannot, however, replace the dearth of evidence 
showing he was aware of the risk he was taking at the time Ms. Romero was 
shot. And, although police noted Mr. Veale did not appear to be especially 
intoxicated during their dealings with him, Mr. Veale's blood alcohol level 
did remain at nearly twice the limit for legal operation of a motor vehicle 
(. 15) six hours after the shooting. Mr. Veale never told anyone - not the 
operator who took his 9-1-1 call, not officers Matheson nor McCarthy, not 
Detective Coleman - that he intended to harm Ms. Romero. There is no 
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evidence Appellant consciously disregarded the risk to Ms. Romero - or 
himself- because there is no evidence he was actually aware the gun was 
loaded at the time of the shooting. 
The "State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed each element of the crime charged." Spanish Fork 
City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 504 (Utah App. 1999) (citation omitted). 
"[N]either possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. (Citing, State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 
1980).) Recklessness is an element of manslaughter. The State did not 
prove recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, even when the 
evidence is looked at in a light most favorable to the verdict. Reasonable 
minds simply could not have determined Mr. Veale acted recklessly because 
there is no evidence he was aware of the risk he was taking, and that he 
consciously disregarded that risk.1 Thus, reasonable minds could not reach a 
verdict of manslaughter. 
1
 Mr. Veale contends he was criminally negligent, not reckless, when he 
caused Ms. Romero's death. Mr. Veale should have been aware of the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk he was taking by handling a gun in his 
inebriated state. This is the standard of criminal negligence, and Mr. Veale 
believes such a finding would have conformed to the evidence presented at 
his trial. See, Utah Code Ann. 76-2-103(4). Mr. Veale concedes his failure 
to perceive the risk of handling a gun while in his condition constituted a 
gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would have 
exercised under the circumstances at the time of the shooting. Id. 
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II. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO OBJECT TO DETAILED 
TESTIMONY ABOUT VICTIM'S GRUESOME WOUNDS 
EVEN THOUGH THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS NOT AT 
ISSUE. 
The cause of death — the result of a shotgun wound caused by 
Appellant ~ was never at issue in this case. Therefore, trial counsel's failure 
to object to detailed, gruesome testimony about the nature of the victim's 
wounds constitutes ineffective assistance. 
"[I]n determining whether criminal defendants, by reason of the 
performance of counsel, have been denied their Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, [the Utah Supreme Court] has followed the United States Supreme 
Court's case of Strickland v. Washington." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 
186 (Utah 1990). Strickland created a two-part test to determine if counsel 
lived up to Constitutional requirements. First, the defendant must "meet the 
heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient 
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced" 
the defendant. State v. Ferry, 163 P.3d 647, 650 (Utah App. 2007) (citation 
and quotation omitted). The Ferry court explained: 
In reviewing an alleged deficiency in counsel's trial performance, we 
must indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, 
[the defendant] must overcome the presumption that under the 
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circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy. Furthermore, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show 
a reasonable probability ... that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different 
Id. (Citations and quotations omitted.) (See also, State v. Templin, 805 P. 
2d 182 (Utah 1990), wherein the court held that a failure of defense counsel 
to adequately investigate availability of prospective defense witnesses 
constituted the failure to render reasonably professional assistance and such 
failure prejudiced the defense.) 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on 
appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 89 P.3d 162 (Utah 2004). 
As the foregoing makes clear, Appellant must clear a high hurdle to 
be successful in his claim here. It is a hurdle Appellant believes he can 
easily clear, based upon a careful review of the record. Trial counsel's 
failure to object to the testimony of the medical examiner is below any 
objective standard of reasonableness. The detailed and gruesome testimony 
of the medical examiner dealt with a subject that was never at issue in this 
trial. Appellant admitted to everybody who asked that he caused the 
victim's death by shotgun. Defense counsel acknowledged this in his 
opening remarks to the jury. (Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 58, lines 15-16; 
and p. 63, lines 13-15.) To make matters worse, the medical examiner's 
testimony was highlighted at one point by the State's introduction of State's 
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Exhibit 15, a mannequin head missing its lower portion to demonstrate the 
wounds caused by the shotgun blast. 
The medical examiner's testimony, and the introduction of Exhibit 15, 
was allowed without objection by defense counsel, even though counsel had 
moved before trial for exclusion of photographs of the victim's wounds. 
Defense counsel's pretrial motion was based on the gruesome nature of the 
photographs and the likelihood such photographs would inflame the jury. 
When the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the prejudice to 
the defendant, a court may exclude the evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. It is inexplicable defense counsel also did not move to 
limit the equally gruesome testimony of the medical examiner, seeking to 
limit her testimony to those facts relevant to the contested issue of 
Appellant's intent (e.g., Dr. Frikke testified the shotgun was in front of Ms. 
Romero and off to the right when it was fired, and that the muzzle of the gun 
was within three or four feet of Ms. Romero.). 
Instead, the medical examiner, Dr. Frikke, testified, without objection 
by counsel, very specifically about the horrific injuries sustained by Ms. 
Romero as a result of the shotgun blast. The medical examiner told the jury 
there were areas of the victim's body that were completely destroyed: 
She had a set of injuries on her face that are quite typical of a shotgun 
wound, in that she has what we call exploding or blowout injuries of 
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the face ... It was basically her lower face. Almost all the bone of her 
lower jaw was missing. The tongue was missing, a lot of its tissue 
and the muscles that are under the jaw. A lot of that tissue was absent. 
... The upper jaw was broken. ... And then the tissues in her neck, 
her larynx, which is her voice box, the trachea, which is the windpipe 
below that, the esophagus, which is behind the voice box, all had 
multiple tears in them where shot pellets had gone through them. ... 
[S]he had skull fractures, fractures on the bottom surface of her skull, 
basically above her left eye and above her left ear and lesser fractures 
above the middle and right side of her head. And she also had 
hemorrhaging, she had blood, had hemorrhaged into the spaces 
around the brain because of that shotgun force. 
(Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 174-177.) Exhibit 15 was admitted into 
evidence, also without objection by defense counsel, during the medical 
examiner's testimony. Exhibit 15, described by the medical examiner as a 
"plastic head mannequin," in which the medical examiner had "hollowed out 
the areas that were destroyed [by the shotgun blast], that were absent, that 
had been completely fragmented and destroyed as a result of the shot shells." 
(Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p 177, lines 16-23.) 
Because the cause of death of the victim by shotgun was not at issue, 
the detailed and gruesome testimony of the medical examiner, accompanied 
by Exhibit 15, could have had but one purpose: to "inflame and arouse the 
jury." See State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968). 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically allows a court to 
exclude evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." 
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This Court has explained what Rule 403 means: "Under Rule 403 analysis, 
the trial court may find evidence to be unfairly prejudicial, and therefore 
inadmissible, 'if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses a sense of 
horror, provokes the instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause the jury to 
base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the 
case.'" State v. Downs, 190 P.3d 17, 21 (Utah App. 2008) (citation 
omitted). Can anything be more arousing to a juror's sympathy, his sense of 
horror, more provoking to his instinct to punish, than to hear that a victim's 
face literally exploded and was destroyed by a shotgun blast? 
Defense counsel's failure to object to the testimony of the medical 
examiner and its gruesome details fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness for any defense attorney. It simply was not reasonable for 
defense counsel not to object. The cause of the victim's death was not at 
issue. The only contested issue at trial was whether Appellant intended to 
kill the victim, did so recklessly, or did so in a criminally negligent manner. 
Gruesome details of the victim's injuries, caused by a shotgun blast, did 
nothing to further the jury's understanding of the issues surrounding 
Appellant's intent. It is very likely, however, that those details produced in 
the jury a sense of horror, and provoked its instinct to punish. 
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 The jury was instructed on all three levels of culpability. See Jury 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore, defense counsel's failure to object to the medical 
examiner's testimony and admission of Exhibit 15 does not fall within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The cause of death was 
not an issue. A description of cause of death in excruciating, graphic, and 
gruesome detail could not benefit the Defendant in any way, and was 
superfluous to the State's case. Defense counsel's failure to object to the 
medical examiner's testimony, when the judge should have excluded it 
under Rule 403, was not a reasonable trial strategy for the defense. Without 
such testimony, the jury is likely to have believed Appellant's assertion that 
the victim's death was a horrible, tragic accident, especially when 
considered in conjunction with the recording of Appellant's 9-1-1 call, a call 
in which Appellant's distress is obvious. (See State's Exhibit 8, Audio Tape 
of 9-1-1 call.) Such considerations can only undermine this Court's 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. It is clear from such considerations 
that Appellant did not receive a fair trial whose results are reliable because 
trial counsel was ineffective. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to 
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reverse the jury's finding the Appellant was guilty of manslaughter. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 2010. 
(lyw' L" j ^ w W 
Robert L. Donohoe 
Attorney for Appellant 
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AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] ' 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
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76-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
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76-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
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76-5-205- Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is 
reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 
76-5-205.5. 
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7K.5-206. Negligent homii-id.-. 
, Criminal homicide constitutes neghgent homicide if the * acting 
• I S N e g l i g e n c e , causes the death of another. 
W?2) NegUgent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
mrfary: C. 1953, 76-5-206, enacted by L. 
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• 
Rule 403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence. 
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